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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 1983, Excel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cargill,
Inc. and the nation's second largest beef packer, signed an agreement
to acquire Spencer Beef, the third largest beef packer.1 Monfort, the
fifth largest competitor in the beef packing industry, brought suit to
enjoin the proposed merger pursuant to sections 7 and 16 of the Clay-
ton Act.2 The United States District Court for the District of Colo-
1. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 761
F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
2. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 572 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person
engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over
the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws,
including sections 13, 14, 18 and 19 of this title, when and under the same condi-
tions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause
loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such
proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an
injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable
loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive
relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate
commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:385
rado issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the proposed
acquisition of Spencer Beef and the defendant Excel appealed.' The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held,
affirmed: A company has standing to obtain an injunction under sec-
tion 16 enjoining a competitor's acquisition of a competing firm where
the plantiff establishes a significant threat of injury causally related to
the acquisition, which is likely to result in a substantial lessening of
competition in the industry. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,
761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).'
Prior to 1984, no federal court had determined whether a com-
petitor could allege a sufficiently plausible theory of threatened anti-
trust injury to obtain an injunction against a competitor's proposed
horizontal merger.' Four recent federal court decisions issued prior
to Monfort, however, addressed competitors' claims of antitrust injury
and granted standing to private companies seeking to enjoin competi-
tors' mergers.6 In each case, the courts looked beyond any immediate
benefits of the mergers and found that the long-term effects of
increased concentration resulting from the acquisition adversely
respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
3. The district court permanently enjoined the proposed acquisition based upon its
findings that:
1. Monfort has standing to challenge the proposed acquisition;
2. The twelve state regional market for the procurement of fed cattle and
the national market for the sale of boxed beef constitute economically significant
markets or submarkets within the beef industry for purposes of analyzing the
proposed acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act;
3. The proposed acquisition may substantially lessen competition in the
regional market for the procurement of fed cattle and the national market for the
sale of boxed beef in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act; and
4. Monfort is threatened with significant loss or damage within the
meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Act as a result of the proposed acquisition,
and injunctive relief should enter to prevent threatened violations of the Act.
Monfort, 591 F. Supp. at 688.
4. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that its order covered Excel's
subsequent acquisition of one of the three Spencer Beef plants, and thus Excel had violated the
December 2, 1983 permanent injunction order by its December 30, 1983 acquisition of the
Oakland, Iowa plant. Monfort, 761 F.2d at 582.
5. Note, Horizontal Mergers, Competitors, and Antitrust Standing Under Section 16 of the
Clayton Act. Fruitless Searches for Antitrust Injury, 70 MINN. L. REV. 931 (1986). The author
argued that courts should not grant standing to competitors because their claims of "antitrust
injury" are usually based upon speculative allegations of predatory behavior. Id. at 953.
6. Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985);
Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985); White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp.
1009 (N.D. Ohio 1985), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Chrysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
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threatened overall competition in the market.7
The significance of the Monfort decision is that the court granted
7. In Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit granted standing to a wholesale/retail gasoline seller to seek injunctive relief
against the proposed merger of a competitor oil company. 754 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1985).
The court stated:
We cannot conceive of a more appropriate plaintiff to challenge defendants'
merger. Caribe is a direct competitor of defendants in the refined gasoline
market. The gravamen of its complaint is that defendants' merger tends to lessen
competition and to yield a greater concentration of firms within that market.
Caribe acknowledges that it has not sustained an actual measurable injury in the
short term flowing from the merger, but it correctly claims that this is not
required for a § 16 action; its allegations that the refined gasoline market has
been harmed by these putative antitrust violations and that it will likely be
"squeezed" out of the market in the foreseeable future because of defendants'
actions are sufficient. Accordingly, we rule that Caribe has alleged sufficient
facts showing it " 'personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' and that the injury
'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and is 'likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.' "
Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Christian Schmidt Brewing
Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., held that two brewers had standing to enjoin the proposed
merger of competing brewers based upon their allegations that the merger would impair the
ability to wholesale and distribute their products because the defendants' increased economic
power would induce distributors to drop the plaintiffs as suppliers. 753 F.2d 1354, 1357 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985). Despite the defendants' argument that any
increase in prices would benefit the plaintiff/competitors, the court found that the harm plain-
tiffs alleged was "an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 1357 (quoting Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
In White Consolidated Industries v. Whirlpool Corp., Inc., an appliance manufacturer
sought to enjoin a competitor's acquisition of a dishwasher manufacturer. 612 F. Supp. 1009
(N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985). The court found that
statistical evidence in the form of high four-firm concentration ratios and high Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index numbers constituted a prima facie case that the proposed merger would have
anticompetitive effects. Id. at 1031. Even though the court rejected as "too speculative" the
plaintiff's contention that the merger would result in predation, leverage, and collusion by
defendants, it nonetheless concluded that the high concentration levels provided substantial
evidence of an anticompetitive effect upon the market and granted the competitor's request for
an injunction. Id. at 1031-32. (The court subsequently vacated the injunction because an
amendment to the supply contract accompanying the proposed merger served to protect ade-
quately the viability of a competing manufacturer's ability to act as a post-transaction check
upon the merged company's increased economic power. White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).
In Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984). The court
refused to grant the motion and found that an automobile manufacturer had standing to seek
injunctive relief against two competitors contemplating a joint venture to produce a new auto-
mobile. Id. at 1187-94. The court stated: "Chrysler alleges, and for the purpose of this
motion, the Court must accept that its injury derives not from the mere existence of a joint
venture, but from the fact that the joint venture parents are GM and Toyota, the first and third
largest automobile companies in the world." Id. at 1193.
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Monfort standing to enjoin the proposed merger despite the possibil-
ity that an alternative price leadership scenario could occur under
which Monfort would not itself be injured (even though consumers
and competition would suffer).' The Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in the Monfort case9 and should definitively establish the type
of threatened injury a competitor must establish to obtain an injunc-
tion blocking a horizontal merger.
This Note analyzes the rationale for granting competitors stand-
ing to enjoin mergers that result in unduly concentrated markets.
Part IIA discusses the need for private enforcement actions to supple-
ment those actions that the administration brings at its discretion.
Part IIB outlines the conflicting theories of the Chicago and Harvard
School approaches to antitrust enforcement policies focusing upon
studies by Harvard School economists which indicate that market
structures characterized by high levels of concentration lead to
anticompetitive practices (contrary to the prevailing views of the cur-
rent administration). Part III argues that regardless of the validity of
either school of thought, the fact that there are conflicting viewpoints
emphasizes the importance of ensuring that judicial development of
antitrust policy is not limited to the dictates of just one economic the-
ory. The conclusion, therefore, is that courts should grant competi-
tors standing to seek review of potentially illegal mergers where there
is a threat of antitrust injury and where the government has chosen
not to bring suit. Because there is no incentive in the short-term for
private parties other than competitors to challenge proposed mergers,
disallowing competitors' suits would result in restricting judicial
review to only those mergers that offend the economic doctrines uti-
lized by the current administration.
II. PRESERVING COMPETITION By PREVENTING ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION
A. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
In devising a framework for the enforcement of antitrust policies,
Congress considered whether the public interest would best be served
by providing for private actions under the antitrust laws or by limit-
ing antitrust enforcement to governmental actions."° Congress finally
8. See infra note 71.
9. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
10. 21 CONG. REC. 2551 (1890) (statements of Sen. Reagan). Congress was concerned
that while "[r]ich corporations and rich men may ... the great mass of people are not able to
employ counsel." Id. at 2564. Thus, those whom Congress intended to be the primary
beneficiaries of the antitrust policies would not have any meaningful access to the courts while
[Vol. 41:385
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provided for both governmental and private rights of action, and in so
doing it created incentives in the antitrust laws to actually encourage
private enforcement actions as a means of supplementing governmen-
tal enforcement." For this reason Congress provided for a prevailing
plaintiff to recover treble damages as well as attorney's fees (and did
not provide for a prevailing defendant to recover attorney's fees).' 2
Congress sought to encourage private enforcement actions
because it perceived governmental resources to be inadequate to pro-
vide vigorous enforcement of antitrust policies.' 3 In addition, this pri-
vate attorney general concept would provide effective enforcement at
the expense of the wrongdoers and not at the expense of the taxpay-
ers. Thus, Congress clearly intended private enforcement actions to
be a major part of antitrust policy.
To ensure that potential antitrust plaintiffs are able to secure the
quality counsel required to bring such complex and difficult litigation,
courts established the "lodestar" concept of awarding attorney's fees
to prevailing plaintiffs. 1' The lodestar concept encourages attorneys
to undertake plaintiffs' antitrust cases because the award of attorney's
fees is calculated by multiplying the higher hourly rates in effect at the
"rich corporations and rich men" would become the only antitrust plaintiffs able to afford a
remedy. See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975)
(The Supreme Court recognized that Congress's intent in passing statutes allowing for
reasonable attorney's fees was to rely heavily upon private enforcement to implement public
policy and referred to "[flee-shifting in connection with treble-damages awards under the
antitrust laws [as] a prime example" of the emphasis upon private suits.).
11. 21 CONG. REC. 2551, 2564 (1890).
12. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE
ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION VII OF THE CLAYTON ACT
POLICY AND LAW 13-18 (1977). The concern over awarding attorney's fees to prevailing
defendants was the fear that such a policy would deter private plaintiffs from enforcing
antitrust laws. As one court stated:
It is well known that a primary objective of the private treble damage suit is to
provide a means for enforcement of the antitrust laws in addition to government
prosecutions. The incentive which the prospect of treble damages provides for
instituting private antitrust actions would be dampened by the threat of
assessment of defendant's attorneys' fees and other costs as a penalty for failure.
Id. at 15 (quoting Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 651
(3d Cir. 1967)); see also P. JONES, LITIGATING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 46 (1984)
(awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs is mandatory in both
treble-damage actions and suits for injunctive relief).
13. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 12, at 13-18.
14. P. JONES, supra note 12, at 546-47. The author observed that the "lodestar" approach
to calculating attorney's fees based upon multiplying the number of hours worked by current
hourly rates "is now well established ... as the proper method of computation of attorneys'
fees in antitrust cases." Id. at 547 (footnote omitted). The court initially developed the
lodestar approach in Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I), and later refined it in Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II).
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conclusion of the case times the total number of hours expended
throughout.1 5 A court may increase this sum at its discretion by
using a multiplier based upon the complexity of the particular case.
The courts have further implemented congressional policy to
encourage private enforcement by providing that the attorney's fees
awardable under the "lodestar" principle are not limited by damages
recovered, and, in fact, may be many times the plaintiff's actual dam-
ages in a meritorious case.' 6 Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff may
be awarded attorney's fees even though he receives only one dollar in
damages or injunctive relief and no actual damages.'"
Encouraging private antitrust actions also ensured that there
would be a pluralism in the development of antitrust doctrine as well
as in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.'" Many different schools
15. P. JONES, supra note 12, at 547, 560.
16. Id. at 548-50.
17. Id. Professor Jones noted that in order for a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief pursuant
to section 16 of the Clayton Act to obtain attorney's fees, he need only have "substantially
prevailed." Thus:
Where an action is brought to enjoin a corporate takeover and the takeover bid is
abandoned after a preliminary injunction has been granted, the fact that no final
judgment is entered in the case does not preclude an award of attorneys' fees.
The fact that the takeover bid was abandoned as a direct consequence of the
preliminary injunction is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the
plaintiff substantially prevailed in the action. The appropriate benchmarks in
determining whether a party has substantially prevailed are the situation
immediately prior to the commencement of the suit, the situation upon
completion of the suit, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting
any changes between the two.
Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
18. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 10-13 (1977). Professor
Sullivan recognized that Congress intended for antitrust doctrines to be developed and
implemented as a system of law. He stated:
In enacting the antitrust laws Congress had in view other desiderata in addition
to the one to which economics grants recognition. The courts have an obligation
to attend all of these goals, not just the one which economists also sanction.
Thinking and writing about the law as though rational resource allocation were
the only goal can only lead to confusion.
Among the non-economic goals of antitrust, all quite tenable as policy
objectives, are a preference for decentralization of economic power, reduction of
the range within which private discretion may be exercised in matters materially
affecting the welfare of others, enhancement of the opportunity for more people
to exercise independently entreprenuerial impulses, and, most blatantly, a social
preference for the small rather than the large-if you will, a nostalgia for that
mythical past when social, governmental and economic organization was
simpler, more comprehensible. Antitrust, indeed, is founded on a populist
tradition, a tradition quite at odds with the scientific rationality that informs
economic theory and that tradition, which shows itself persistently in legislative
developments, makes its own legitimate claim on judicial attention and, viewed
quite pragmatically, has its effects on the developing law which the lawyer cannot
ignore even if the economist can or must.
[Vol. 41:385
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of thought exist as to both the desirability of the antitrust laws and
the extent to which they should be enforced or extended. 9 Leaving
enforcement solely in the hands of the current administration could,
under permissive administrations, result in meritorious cases being
artificially withheld from judicial consideration. Having both private
and public enforcement mechanisms thus better ensures that the judi-
ciary will be given the opportunity to consider all possible violations
of the antitrust laws and not only the ones the administration selects
for prosecution.
The need for private antitrust enforcement actions to supplement
governmental actions has increased with changes in administrations.2 °
Statistics show that while merger activity levels expanded greatly dur-
ing the period between 1981 and 1985, the government brought fewer
actions than in preceding periods when fewer mergers took place. 21
The government's diminished intervention in merger activity can be
explained in several ways.
First, the regulatory policies of government agencies vary
according to the perspectives of its personnel. In 1969, Richard W.
McClaren, as head of the Nixon Administration's Antitrust Division
challenged 30% of all large mergers in manufacturing and mining.
This action was in response to congressional concerns that mergers
resulting in high concentration levels lessened competition and posed
the threat of monopoly activities.22
In 1981, President Reagan appointed William F. Baxter as anti-
trust chief and Dr. James Miller III as chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission.23 Both adhere to principles of the Chicago School of
economics. Chicago School economists theorize that mergers result-
Id. at 11.
19. See infra note 39.
20. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
21. Mueller, Wrong Signals on Antitrust, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1986, at A17, col. 2.
Professor Mueller stated that the Justice Department challenged only 28 mergers between
1981 and 1985 whereas during the less active period between 1976 and 1980, the Department
challenged 39 mergers. He concluded that the Reagan administration has abandoned
prosecution of many violators based on the "Chicago School" rationale that mergers "almost
invariably promote efficiency; dominance of a market by one of a few firms is unlikely to harm
competitors or consumers; and government is the prime source of monopoly." Id. at Al 7, col.
2. Professor Mueller criticized the federal agencies' acceptance of this school of thought, with
economic studies showing that "mergers among large companies increase inefficiency and that
companies with high market share usually charge higher prices than companies with a smaller
share of any particular market." Id. at A17, col. 2.
22. Mueller, A New Attack on Antitrust. The Chicago Case, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 29 (1986) (text of an address Professor Willard F. Mueller gave at the University of
Florida, April 4, 1986).
23. Id.
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ing in high concentration levels are not necessarily harmful to the
economy and may result in increased efficiency and greater competi-
tiveness.24 Because governmental interference with business decisions
to acquire other firms is inconsistent with this philosophy, it is not
surprising that between 1981 and 1984 the Federal Trade Commis-
sion declined to initiate investigations into a single conglomerate
merger, nor were any challenges made to vertical mergers.25 The
24. Id. According to the proponents of the Chicago School, economic efficiency is the
primary goal of the antitrust laws. Because the Chicago School proponents assume that firm
decisions to merge are based on profit-maximization, mergers may result in increased
efficiencies in the market and lead to procompetitive results. Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief
About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, THE NEW LEARNING 64 (1974). But see
Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A
Response, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 83 (1984) (emphasizing the need for antitrust policies to be in accord with the
expressed congressional intent behind passing the antitrust laws). Mr. Spivack stated that
Congress intended:
to prohibit resale price maintenance, tie-ins by firms with market power over a
tying product, and predatory pricing by dominant firms-irrespective of any
supposed theoretical demonstration that such practices are unlikely to result in a
deadweight loss as shown on an economist's graph. The Supreme Court's
antitrust cases have generally been consistent with the congressional
objectives....
* to preserve a deconcentrated industrial structure;
* to disperse economic power;
* to provide free access to markets;
* to foster individual economic freedom;
* to encourage local ownership of business;
* to provide self-policing markets and thus reduce the
need for governmental control;
* to promote fairness in economic dealings; and
* to lessen inequalities in economic conditions.
Id. at 84-85 (footnotes omitted).
Mr. Spivack further argued, "If this [Chicago School] view of the antitrust laws were to pre-
vail, it goes almost without saying that dozens of the Supreme Court's antitrust decisions
would have to be overruled." Id. at 84. For a discussion of the differences between the Chi-
cago and Harvard Schools regarding antitrust policies and an argument that the two schools of
thought are converging, see Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, in ANTITRUST
LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (0. Williamson ed. 1980). For an excellent overview and enumera-
tion of criticisms directed at the Chicago School, see Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chi-
cago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985). Professor Hovenkamp noted that the Chicago
neoclassical efficiency model's fallacy is its reliance upon static market concepts. "That notion
both overstates the ability of the policymaker to apply such a model to real world affairs and
understates the complexity of the process by which the policymaker must select among com-
peting policy values." Id. at 284.
25. Mueller, supra note 22. Professor Mueller noted that the agencies successfully
challenged a number of horizontal mergers. These challenges, however, were "largely paper
victories that ended with consent decrees permitting the mergers after requiring modest partial
divestiture." Id. at 34. The federal agencies failed to challenge other mergers that clearly
violated the Department's merger guidelines; for example, Pepsi Cola's acquisition of Seven
Up, and Coca Cola's acquisition of Dr. Pepper:
[Vol. 41:385
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incumbent administration's attitude toward big businesses and the
antitrust laws clearly influences governmental enforcement actions.
In contrast, private enforcement actions are immune to the philosoph-
ical changes that come and go with different administrations.
. The Department of Justice's adoption of new merger guidelines
has also contributed to the declining numbers of governmental chal-
lenges to mergers. The new guidelines utilize the Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI) to measure industry concentration levels.26 As
contrasted with the prior guidelines, the HHI results in a higher
threshold point of concentration which must be met before the
Department will challenge a proposed merger. 27  The Department,
therefore, may now decline to challenge mergers in markets with
postmerger four-firm concentration ratios above 70%.28 Yet, under
the 1968 guidelines the Department would have challenged these
mergers, and according to contemporaneous judicial decisions, these
same concentration levels resulting from horizontal mergers may have
been condemned.29
An additional consideration affecting governmental abilities to
The merger guidelines declare that: "The department is likely to challenge any
mergers in [markets with Herfindahl indexes over 1,800] that produce an
increase . . . of more than 50 points. ... The soft-drink industry had a pre-
merger Herfindahl index exceeding 2,500. Pepsi Cola's acquisition of 7-Up
would increase the Herfindahl index by about 300 points and Coca Cola's
acquisition of Dr. Pepper would increase the Herfindahl index by about 550
points.
Id. at 59-60 n.3.
26. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.- of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1983). The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculates
concentration by adding together the square of the percentage market share of each
competitor. Where this figure exceeds 1800, the Justice Department will probably challenge
any merger adding 50 to 100 points (calculated by multiplying the product of the market
shares of the merging companies by two) to the HHI. Id. at 510-14.
27. Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN
TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 319, 324 (1984).
28. The Justice Department, in the face of conflicting economic studies and the difficulties
of proving potential anticompetitive effects from mergers, errs on the side of nonintervention
where the HHI measure is between 1000 and 1800, and where mergers above that level
increase the HHI by less than 100 points (roughly the equivalent of four-firm ratios ranging
from 50 to 70 percent). Kauper, supra note 26, at 516.
29. Id. Professor Kauper discussed United States v. General Dynamics Corp., where the
Supreme Court recognized a four-firm concentration ratio of less than 70 percent as sufficient
to make out a prima facie case of antitrust violation. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). He also cited
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982) and United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956,
958-59 (D. Conn. 1975) as other examples of cases where violations were found based upon
concentration levels below the high-end threshold levels of the Department's guidelines. For a
discussion on how the HHI calculates firm market shares and the general standards set by the
guidelines to challenge horizontal mergers, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 248-49 (1985).
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thoroughly enforce antitrust laws and increasing the need for private
enforcement is the lack of adequate government resources. Regard-
less of the administration's philosophy, the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission do not have the ability to prosecute
every acquisition that threatens reduced competition.3" When the
Department of Justice decides which cases to bring, it would logically
select those cases where the government is most likely to prevail on
the merits. Cases that fall below the new HHI standards may be more
costly and time-consuming to prove, and pose a higher risk of failure
on the merits than those cases meeting the guidelines' threshold. The
government, therefore, is less likely to challenge mergers below the
HHI threshold, even though the acquisitions involved threaten to
lessen competition.
Yet, because it is difficult to separate the firms and return the
industry to a competitive status once the merger has been consum-
mated, allowing potentially illegal mergers to go unchallenged often
results in irreparable damage to the market.3" Thus, in light of
decreased governmental challenges to proposed mergers, granting
standing to private parties to enjoin potentially illegal mergers prior
to consummation has become an even more important component of
antitrust policy.
B. Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Preventing Concentration
in Its Incipiency
According to some economic theorists, when the number of sell-
ers in a particular market increases, the likelihood that they will try to
undercut competing prices also increases, while their ability to
achieve coordinated behavior decreases.32 Conversely, the fewer the
number of sellers, the more likely they are to recognize the mutual
advantage of explicitly or implicitly coordinating their behavior and
30. Note, The Use of Divestiture in Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 261
(1974). The author noted that:
The need for private suits resulted from the practical limitations on the
Government's capacity to enforce the antitrust laws. With limited resources, the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission cannot prosecute
every antitrust violation. Moreover, the Government, under political pressure or
in an effort to maintain a consistent enforcement policy, may refuse to act for
largely extra-legal reasons. Under such circumstances, a private party's sole
recourse against illegal competition may be a private antitrust action.
Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted).
31. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.




prices which leads to a near monopoly outcome.33 This type of mar-
ket structure-where a small number of firms control a high percent-
age of market share enhancing their ability to tacitly or overtly engage
in noncompetitive pricing decisions-is called an oligopoly. 3 4
There are conflicting theories regarding the degree of harm oli-
gopolies cause as well as what percentage level of concentration
within a particular market constitutes an oligopoly that would raise
antitrust concerns. 35  The "Chicago School" approach to oligopoly
suggests that an industry characterized by high levels of concentration
has the potential for substantial welfare gains. The focus is upon price
theory and attaining economic efficiency.3 6 Thus, proponents of this
school observe that certain industries require concentrated markets to
achieve the highest level of economic efficiency through large econo-
mies of scale.37 Accordingly, the existence of oligopolistic market
33. Professors Blair and Kaserman pointed out that:
When only a few firms populate an industry, the firms inevitably must recognize
that the industry structure causes interdependent pricing. Each firm knows that
its optimal price is a function of the price charged by its rivals. Under these
circumstances, it would be silly to expect the firm to ignore the obvious and
blithely act as though they were totally independent.
R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 29, at 200.
34. Due to their consciousness of interdependence, oligopolistic industries decrease
competition in the market resulting in harm to the economy as well as to the consumer.
Characteristics observed in oligopolistic markets are:
that prices tend to be too high and output too low; that rivalry tends to take
forms which we should not hesitate to characterize as socially unwholesome; that
overcapacity tends to persist; that prices are not adequately responsive to changes
in cost or demand; that price discrimination is widely prevalent.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 347 (footnotes omitted).
35. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 29, at 252-53; Miller, Measures of Monopoly
Power and Concentration: Their Economic Significance, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 119 (1955) (discussing different indexes used to determine monopoly power);
Rosenbluth, Measures of Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 57
(1955) (an overview of indexes used to measure concentration); Scitovsky, Economic Theory
and the Measurement of Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
101 (1955) (The author argues that measurements of concentration based on effects do not
accurately determine the degree of oligopoly.); see infra note 39.
36. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 163-224 (1978); Posner, supra note 24, at 24.
37. R. BORK, supra note 36, at 163-97. Judge Bork stated that oligopolistic behavior:
rarely results in any significant ability to restrict output. . . . [M]ost mergers
would not involve any dead-weight loss, and even large mergers involving fewer
than all significant rivals in the market would rarely increase the slope of the
firm's demand curve enough to pose a serious problem. The effect would usually
be outweighed by cost savings.
... [S]ince mergers may very well create substantial new efficiencies, we are in an
area of uncertainty when we ask whether mergers that would concentrate a
market to only two firms of roughly equal size should be prohibited. My guess is
that they should not and, therefore, that mergers up to 60 or 70 percent of the
market should be permitted. ...
Id. at 221.
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structures are not perceived as a threat to the vitality of particular
industries, and in fact, are encouraged to promote greater economic
efficiency and gains to consumers.
Advocates of the "Harvard School" of economics have a very
different view of the effects of oligopoly. They rely upon studies
showing that an oligopoly market structure results in "significantly
higher profit rates [and larger] minimum efficient sizes and capital
requirements.""8 In creating those effects and increasing the threat of
predation by leading firms in the industry, Harvard School econo-
mists conclude that an oligopoly discourages new entrants into the
market while harming smaller existing companies. 9
Studies of the automobile industry as representative of oligopolis-
tic industries indicate that price leadership is another common char-
acteristic of an oligopolistic market.4" Price leadership occurs where
a small number of firms control high percentages of market share
causing them to recognize their interdependence.41 When one firm
(usually the leading firm) raises its prices, the others simply follow,
without the need for overt collusion. If one of the competitors refuses
to follow and tries to increase its market share by selling at a lower
price, the leading firms can use their collective market power to retali-
ate, preventing the independent firm's efforts from succeeding and
38. White, Searching for the Critical Concentration Ratio: An Application of the
"Switching of Regimes" Technique, in STUDIES IN NONLINEAR ESTIMATION 68 (1976)
(citation omitted); see also H. GOLDSCHMID, H. MANN & J. WESTON, INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (1974) (discussing the "structuralist" thesis of
market behavior-industrial structure determines the competitive behavior of firms within the
industry). The editors noted that antitrust enforcement policies should be directed at
reforming structural conditions of particular industries to ensure competitive performance as
opposed to emphasizing solely individual elements of monopolistic practices such as price
fixing, and price leadership.
39. Id. For a discussion of schools of thought that disagree with the theory that
oligopolies necessarily result in anticompetitive monopoly practices, see R. BLAIR & D.
KASERMAN, supra note 29, at 202-04 (discussing one view that the rational oligopolist behaves
similarly to a competitive firm); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 333 (noting different theories
regarding the performance of firms in oligopolistic markets and the emphasis upon efficiency of
Judge Bork and the Chicago School economists); Spivack, supra note 24, at 184 (the Chicago
perspective is that the objective of antitrust laws is to prevent "deadweight loss").
Authorities have also disagreed whether predatory pricing practices actually develop from
oligopolistic market structures. R. BORK, supra note 37, at 149-55. Judge Bork argues "that
predatory price cutting is most unlikely to exist and that attempts to outlaw it are likely to
harm consumers more than would abandoning the effort." Id. at 155; see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986) (Predatory pricing
conspiracies are unlikely to occur because "the success of such schemes is inherently uncertain:
the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the
competition.").
40. White, A Legal Attack on Oligopoly Pricing: The Automobile Fleet Sales Case, 9 J.
EcON. ISSUES 271.(1975).
41. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 339-41.
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eventually forcing it to conform. Thus, even though the firms do not
enter into explicit price fixing agreements, their behavior results in the
same pricing evils that the prohibition against express price fixing
agreements seeks to prevent.42
Market structures characterized by high concentration levels also
harm consumers by resulting in less product variety and decreased
innovation in products and services than in competitive markets.4" In
competitive markets, innovation and product variety are often used to
increase sales and market share. An oligopolist, however, must con-
sider that offering a second product variety (which inevitably
increases its costs) may result in retaliation from the other leading
firms diminishing the profits it already earns." Therefore, according
to the Harvard School of economic theory, unless leading firms in
highly concentrated markets are able to engage in price discrimina-
tion with different product varieties, their tendency will be to offer
nonoptimal varieties.45
The same disincentive that limits product variety also causes
decreased product innovation. 46 Economists have associated competi-
tive market structures with increased development and promotion of
new products. Empirical studies indicate that an oligopolistic market
structure also decreases incentives for technical progress by decreas-
ing competition. 47  Thus, the Harvard School contends that many
undesirable characteristics result from high levels of concentration.
The fewer the number of sellers and the higher the concentration in
the top four firms, the more the results of the oligopoly come to
approximate a monopoly market structure.48
Recent statistical studies have indicated that industries in which
the four largest firms have a total market share of 56% or more are
characterized by significantly higher profit levels than industries
42. Id.
43. White, Market Structure and Product Varieties, 67 A. ECON. REV. 179 (1977)
[hereinafter White, Market Structure]; White, A Note on the Influence ofMonopoly on Product
Innovation, 86 Q.J. ECON. 342 (1972) [hereinafter White, Influence of Monopoly].
44. White, Market Structure, supra note 43, at 179.
45. Id.
46. White, Influence of Monopoly, supra note 43 (A monopolist will not be as likely to use
a sleeping patent which could lead to creation of a new product.). But see Swan, Market
Structure and Technological Progress: The Influence of Monopoly on Product Innovation, 84
Q.J. ECON. 627-38 (1970) (arguing that the interest of the monopolist will be to introduce new
products at the same time as competitive firms). For a discussion of the conflicting theories
regarding the effect of market structure on product innovation and a comparison of Professors
Arrow and Demsetz's empirical studies, see generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note
29, at 41-45.
47. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 29, at 41.
48. Id. at 192-225.
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below that threshold.4 9 These studies indicate to some Harvard
School economists that 56 to 59% is the critical four-firm concentra-
tion ratio above which an oligopoly adversely affects competition in
the industry."0 Yet other schools of thought, such as the Chicago
School, would advocate not challenging mergers causing concentra-
tion at these levels. In addition, under the HHI merger guidelines,
mergers in the 56 to 59% range would probably no longer be chal-
lenged in governmental actions.5
Congress, however, intended section 7 of the Clayton Act 52 to
49. White, supra note 38, at 61. Professor White's study in nonlinear estimation used the
"switching regimes" technique. This technique uses two sets of assumptions in solving
equations to match variables with different values under different circumstances. Id. at 62-64.
50. Id. Other studies confirmed the critical concentration levels found in this study:
It is interesting to note that the switching point of 56-59 percent reported here is
quite close to the point (55 percent) found by Meehan and Duchesneau (1973)
and not too far from the point (50 percent) found by Rhoades (1973), though
these authors used different models, data sources, and techniques. Further, the
four firm concentration ratio switching point of 56-59 percent corresponds
closely to an eight firm concentration ratio of 70-72 percent .... Thus, Bain's
original findings do seem to be confirmed on new data and with a more
sophisticated model.
Id. at 72. See generally Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited, 14 J.L.
EcON. 351 (1971) (Bain's study found higher profit rates in industries with an eight-firm con-
centration ration of 70%.); Meehan & Duchesneau, The Critical Level of Concentration: An
Empirical Analysis, 22 J. INDUS. ECON. 21 (1973) (switching point is 55%); Rhoades &
Cleaver, The Nature of the Concentration-Price/Cost Margin Relationship for 352 Manufactur-
ing Industries: 1967, 40 S. ECON. J. 90 (1973) (switching point is 50%).
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person
engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (emphasis added). The original section 7 did not
extend to asset acquisitions. Congressmen, therefore, criticized the section for leaving a sub-
stantial loophole open to potential antitrust violators:
[I]t would have been much better for the economy of the country to have
repealed Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act rather than let this wide-open
loophole to remain. Most of the large and monopolistic mergers which have
become detrimental to the free-enterprise system of our Nation have occurred by
way of this plain evasion of the intent of the original Clayton Act.
96 CONG. REC. 16,451 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). Thus, Congress passed the Celler-
Kefauver Act in 1950 amending Section 7 to prohibit asset acquisitions and statutory mergers
of corporations where the effect of such mergers may be to lessen competition substantially.
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (amending Clayton Act, ch.
323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current -version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982))). For a discussion of
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stop potential monopolies in their initial stages. 3 Congress acted in
response to what it perceived as a rising tide of concentration that
increased the possibility of collusion, resulting in dangerous eco-
nomic, political, and social effects in the market.54 Section 7 was
intended to stop this tide of concentration by preventing large merg-
ers from placing economic and financial power in fewer hands creat-
ing an oligopolistic market structure and lessening competition."
In order to achieve its purpose, Congress recognized that it was
necessary to take action prior to the completion of mergers where the
likely result was a substantial lessening of competition. Once a
merger has been consummated, it is difficult to gain adequate relief
through postmerger litigation because often the blending of identities
of the acquired and acquiring firms is irreversible.56 Divestiture is
expensive and the courts rarely decree such relief; additionally, it sel-
the 1950 amendment of section 7, its legislative history, and possible implications, see D. MAR-
TIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 305-10 (1959).
53. H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2572, 2639-41; D. MARTIN, supra note 52, at 315-26.
54. The history of the passage of section 7 reveals that Congress's "belief that democracy
can be preserved only by dispersing and decentralizing economic and financial power, together
with other dismaying records of turn-of-the-century monopolistic excesses that were
unchecked by the Sherman Act, directly led to the enactment of section 7 of the Clayton Act
in 1914." H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2572, 2639 (footnote omitted); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 21-23 (1981)
(noting that Representative Celler presented statistics to Congress showing that 45
corporations controlled a total of 1 percent of the country's corporate assets). Additionally,
Representative Douglas showed that between 1915 and 1945 mergers resulted in 76% of the
long-term growth in the copper industry and 84% of the steel industry's growth. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2572, 2639-41. Representative Carlin interpreted section 7 as strengthening
the Sherman Act by extending the antitrust laws to cover acts resulting in decreased
competition as opposed to only those acts resulting in actual restraints of trade. 51 CONG.
REC. 9045, 9070 (1914).
Under this bill there has to be only a lessening of competition. Competition may
be lessened without restraint of trade. Competition may be lessened without
attempt to monopolize. Competition may be lessened without conspiracy. It
may be the natural effect of the putting together in close relationship through a
holding company of two corporations that are natural competitors, or ought to
be.
Id. at 9271 (statement of Rep. Carlin).
56. The legislative history of section 7 stressed the need to stop large mergers prior to
consummation because once the merger is completed and antitrust violations have occurred:
it is often too late to enforce effectively the Clayton Act, by gaining meaningful
relief. During the course of the post-merger litigation, the acquired firm's assets,
technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced, transferred, sold
off, or combined with those of the acquiring firm. Similarly, its personnel and
management are shifted, retrained, or simply discharged.
H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2637, 2640.
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dom restores the acquired firm to its premerger level of competitive-
ness." Thus, divestiture can result in even greater harm to the
market.
In accordance with congressional intent, the Supreme Court in
Brown Shoe v. United States held that section 7 is concerned with
"probable effects" upon the market from a merger; it does not require
a showing of "certain" anticompetitive effects." In determining the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects, the courts are to look at a partic-
ular company's percentage of the market share within a given area.
Where a merger would result in a firm controlling an undue percent-
age of market share and would result in a significant increase in con-
centration, a court should prohibit the acquisition on the grounds that
it "is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." 59
Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes private parties to seek
protection from an impending violation of section 7 and to obtain
injunctive relief upon a showing of "antitrust injury, which is to say
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 60 Because
the purpose of seeking relief under section 16 is to prevent threatened
damage, the courts have not required private parties to show actual
injury to business or property.6' The only requisite for a private
57. Id. at 9; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 669-73. One commentator noted various
court decisions disallowing divestiture as a remedy under sections 7 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
Note, supra note 30, at 261 (citing Continental Securities Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d
378 (6th Cir. 1926); American Commercial Barge Line v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc., 204 F.
Supp. 451, 453 (S.D. Ohio 1962); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F.
Supp. 532, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953)). He
cited two cases, hovhever,'as examples of decisions wherein the courts did order divestiture as a
means of restoring competition and remedying private plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 261-62 (citing
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972); International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972)). See also
Kintner & Wilberding, Enforcement of the Merger Laws by Private Party Litigation, 47 IND.
L.J. 293 (1972) (courts are reluctant to order divestiture as a remedy under section 16 of the
Clayton Act).
58. 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
59. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). Not only is the
degree of concentration an indication of a substantial lessening of competition, but the
Supreme Court has found that evidence of the existence of a "trend" toward concentration
indicates decreased competition in a market. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546, 552 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966).
60. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
61. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 259 (1972) (comparing the requirements for
obtaining relief under section 4, which requires a showing of actual injury, with section 16,
which only requires a showing of threatened injury); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969) (Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under section 16 of
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plaintiff to have standing is a causal connection between antitrust
injury and the putative antitrust violation.62
The Supreme Court has recognized lower standing requirements
for purely injunctive actions under section 16 due to the fact that sec-
tion 16 relief involves none of the risks of duplicative recovery or
potentially disastrous monetary judgments which exist with the sec-
tion 4 treble damage remedy.63 Thus, to obtain standing under sec-
tion 16 the Court has held that the complainant "need only
demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation
of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to con-
tinue or recur."' Because section 7 deals with "probable effects" and
the standing inquiry under section 16 is founded upon a causality
analysis, a private party seeking injunctive relief against an alleged
illegal merger has only been required to show that a mergerwill result
in undue concentration within the market, and that as a result of such
concentration, injury is threatened.
III. COMPETITORS STANDING: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST AND ENSURING PLURALISM
The existence of conflicting economic schools of thought
attempting to shape antitrust doctrine increases the need to ensure
pluralism in the enforcement of antitrust laws. The current adminis-
tration's application of the Chicago School's neoclassical market effi-
ciency model presents only one economic theory for the development
the Clayton Act "need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending
violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur.");
Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985) (The standard
a plaintiff must satisfy for an injunction to issue is a showing of "threatened" injury as a result
of an antitrust violation.); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1975)
("To achieve standing under § 16 the petitioner must demonstrate that he is threatened with
loss or injury proximately resulting from the antitrust violation.").
62. See supra note 61.
63. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., the Supreme Court noted that standing under section
16 differs from standing under section 4 in that section 16 requires only an injury cognizable in
equity and does not involve the potential for recovery of treble damages or attorney's fees. 405
U.S. 259, 260 (1972); see also Midwest Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573, 576 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[A] claim for injunctive relief does not present the countervailing
considerations-such as the risk of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a trial
bordered with complex and conjectural economic analyses-that the Supreme Court
emphasized when limiting the availability of treble damages."); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he broader language of
section 16 lacks mention of 'business or property', an omission signalling different standing
requirements. This treatment is fully justified by the difference between the remedies available
under each section."); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 772 (recognizing the lower threshold
requirement of "threatened loss or damage" in section 16 actions).
64. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969).
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of antitrust policy-a theory which several commentators have criti-
cized for its application of static model concepts to the real world
market.6" Should standing be denied to competitors seeking to enjoin
mergers that endanger competition according to the principles of
other schools of economic thought, the courts will be foreclosed from
examining conflicting economic views and interpreting congressional
intent regarding antitrust doctrine. The danger in the courts' expo-
sure to only one economic model of antitrust policy is that the chosen
paradigm will shape the application of antitrust laws to the exclusion
of other models. As one author noted: "The upshot is a vendomat
jurisprudence: a model is plunked in, a legal result pops out. Wit-
tingly or not, antitrust law comes to serve the proclivities, or gullibili-
ties, of proponents of one or the other economic model and its hidden
ideology within."66 Antitrust policy is simply too important to allow
it to be the captive of only one view or school of thought, even if the
view is that of the incumbent administration.
Both the district and circuit courts in Monfort ruled that a com-
petitor has standing to obtain injunctive relief against a proposed
merger that would create undue concentration in an industry even
though no other anticompetitive acts had yet occurred.67 Those deci-
sions are consistent with congressional intent as well as prior judicial
decisions.6"
The legislative history of the passage of the Clayton Act clearly
established that competitors are among those private parties that
Congress sought to encourage to bring suits when there were viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.69 The fears that competitors will bring
65. Hovenkamp, supra note 24. Professor Hovenkamp criticized the Chicago school of
thought stating:
[T]he neoclassical market efficiency model is itself too simple to account for or to
predict business firm behavior in the real world. The model has proved to be
particularly inept at identifying many forms of strategic behavior. In large part
this is so because the market efficiency model is static and dwells too much on
long-run effects. In the real world, short-run considerations are critical to
business planning. Furthermore, the short run can be a very long time. In many
industries a monopoly that lasts only for the short run can inflict great economic
loss on society. By ignoring the short run, the market efficiency model fails to
appreciate the social cost of many forms of monopolistic behavior.
Id. at 284.
66. Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law
and Economics, 72 GEo L.J. 1511, 1569 (1984).
67. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 761
F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
68. See supra notes 29 & 55.
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2572, 2589. "The antitrust laws clearly reflect the national policy of
encouraging private parties (whether consumers, businesses, or possible competitors) to help
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unmeritorious suits to enjoin or delay proposed mergers in order to
decrease competition, rather than preserve it, are diminished by (1)
the courts' standing criteria, which requires a causal connection
between threatened antitrust violations and injury to the competitor,
and (2) procedural rules, which permit injunctive actions to be heard
on an expedited basis either upon preliminary injunction motions or
in advanced trial settings.70 Few mergers need be or can be completed
quickly. Thus, the benefits society may gain from ensuring that
potentially meritorious cases are presented to the courts for considera-
tion on their merits far outweighs any benefits that could be associ-
ated with a policy of dismissing such cases on standing grounds and
never considering their merit.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the threat of pre-
dation was sufficient to grant Monfort standing because a causal con-
nection would exist between the antitrust violation and injury to the
competitor.7' The court found that Monfort had established that it
was threatened with injury as a direct result of the merger based upon
the likelihood that the leading firms would engage in anticompetitive
activities to increase their profits and drive smaller independent
enforce the antitrust laws in order to protect competition through compensation of antitrust
victims, through punishment of antitrust violators, and through deterrence of antitrust
violations." Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
70. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2950 (1973).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) provides that a court may order a trial to be advanced
and consolidated with a preliminary injunction because "the urgency that is characteristic of
cases involving preliminary injunction applications makes a rapid determination of the merits
especially important." Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
71. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 784 (1986). The court acknowledged Monfort's claim that Excel would be able to:
engage in what we consider to be a form of predatory pricing in which Excel will
drive other companies out of the market by paying more to its cattle suppliers
and charging less for boxed beef that it sells to institutional buyers and
consumers. The resulting cost-price squeeze will, according to Monfort, reduce
its profit margin and drive it and other companies out of business. Once that
occurs Excel will then use its market power to charge monopoly prices for its
beef. Thus, according to Monfort, the harm to competition will follow an
intense, but ersatz, period of competition during which Excel will increase its
market share. Although Monfort does not discuss less drastic results, it is also
possible that such a pricing strategy could enable Excel to demonstrate its price
leadership to its competitors and force them to follow its artificially high boxed
beef prices. Such a result would probably help Monfort but hurt competition by
promoting tacit collusion. Monfort contends that Excel would be better able to
engage in such a sustained period of predatory pricing if it possessed the
additional market power that would come with increased market share following
acquisition of Spencer Beef. Thus it claims that the harm to competition, as well
as the injury it will suffer as a competitor, is directly tied to the putative Clayton
Act section 7 violation.
Id. at 575.
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processors, such as Monfort, out of business.72 Because of the high
levels of concentration that would result from the proposed merger of
Excel and Spencer Beef, the court concluded that Excel and IBP, the
largest producer in the beef-packing industry, were likely to cause this
price-cost squeeze in a profit-maximizing effort to increase their mar-
ket shares. Thus, Monfort, as a direct competitor, as well as consum-
ers of boxed beef and sellers of fed cattle, would suffer injury.7 3
In Monfort, the plaintiff-competitor proved that the beef packing
industry had been experiencing a marked trend toward concentration
with the two largest firms, Excel and IBP, dominating largely as a
result of acquisitions by the two companies as opposed to internal
expansion.74 Monfort also provided figures indicating that the pro-
posed acquisition would increase the four-firm concentration ratio in
the input market to 57.5% and the two-firm concentration ratio of
IBP and Excel to 44.8%.75 In the output market for the industry the
four-firm concentration ratio would rise to 59.5% and the two-firm
concentration market share would be 47.7% if Excel consummated
the proposed acquisition.76 While such trends would be downplayed
under the static analysis approach of the Chicago School, 77 the
Supreme Court has previously recognized that trends toward industry
concentration indicate decreased competition. Moreover, a merger
resulting in a significant increase in concentration within an industry
is presumed illegal. 78 Recent economic studies that place the critical
point of harmful concentration in an industry at a 55% four-firm con-
72. Id. at 574-78.
73. The district court noted that "in the instant case, the consumers of boxed beef and the
sellers of fed cattle have no motivation, in the short term, to attack the planned sale because, at
least initially, it would be a direct benefit to them." Monfort, 591 F. Supp. at 693.
74. Monfort noted two significant developments in the beef packing industry:
First, boxed beef was introduced in the 1960's. In the past twenty years, boxed
beef has come to dominate the industry, now accounting for over 80% of all table
cuts of beef purchased by retail supermarkets and the hotel, restaurant and
institutional trade. Second, in a much shorter period of time, the beef packing
industry has experienced a marked trend toward concentration, and with it,
domination by the two largest firms: IBP, Inc. and Excel. Significantly, Excel's
growth has been largely through acquisition rather than internal expansion.
Most importantly, the rise of these two firms has been coupled with the demise of
a multitude of smaller packing companies. Between 1978 and 1982 alone, the
four-firm market share in the market for the procurement of fed cattle (the
"procurement market") rose from 37.3% to 52%.
Brief for Monfort of Colo., Inc., Respondent in Opposition on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
2, Monfort (No. 85-473).
75. Brief for Appellee at 23, Monfort (Nos. 83-2588 & 84-1305).
76. Id.
77. For a discussion of the fallacy of the Chicago School neoclassical efficiency model's
premise based upon the static market, see Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 284.
78. See supra note 59.
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centration ratio are consistent with the courts' decisions in Monfort.7 9
Thus, the evidence presented concerning concentration in the indus-
try appears to justify an injunction.
But did Monfort itself stand to be injured by the increased con-
centration? Excel seriously questioned this issue in challenging
Monfort's standing to bring suit."° It is true that at the point the
merger was proposed, no other overt anticompetitive acts directed at
Monfort had occurred. It is possible that Monfort would eventually
survive and be a beneficiary of increased concentration. Monfort
could itself merge with another competitor and help drive others out
of the market. Or Monfort could benefit from price leadership and
other quasi-collusive practices by which all of the oligopolists increase
profits and decrease competitiveness and costs. Only some of these
possible scenarios would harm Monfort directly even though the pub-
lic interest and competition would surely suffer. Thus, Excel's argu-
ment that Monfort had no standing under these circumstances has
superficial appeal. However, one of the elements the courts are
required to consider when awarding injunctive relief is whether such
relief benefits the public."' This follows from the fact that injunctive
relief is intended to and generally does affect more than just the par-
ties before the court. This public interest in injunctive actions inevita-
bly makes such actions different than damages actions.
Courts require a litigant in treble damages actions to prove his
personal losses and are careful not to allow one litigant to recover
damages for injuries that another company more directly suffered.82
Treble damages relief is a punishment and a deterrent, but paying
treble damages for the same act to several different plaintiffs can deci-
mate a company and itself harm competition. 3 Thus, in damages
actions, courts must focus upon the injury that the plaintiff suffered as
a direct result of the defendant's conduct.
On the other hand, in a purely injunctive action where a court is
convinced that a proposed merger will harm competition and is con-
79. See supra note 50.
80. Excel argued that Monfort would benefit from the merger because Monfort would
have fewer competitors and could take advantage of the oligopolistic market structure.
Furthermore, Excel contended that all competitors should be denied standing to enjoin
mergers because any injury suffered would be the result of increased competition and
"antitrust laws were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.' " Monfort of
Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784
(1986) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
81. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 70, § 2948.
82. S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 1088
(1981); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 769-74.
83. See supra note 82.
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trary to the public interest, predicting exactly which parties the future
acquisition will harm is of less concern than it would be in a treble
damages action. 4 Instead, protecting the public interest becomes
paramount. If a court was required to deny an injunction because a
given plaintiff-competitor could not prove with certainty that it would
be a victim of the increased concentration although it established that
consumers and some competitors would surely be injured, society
would be relegated to trying to remedy the injury after it had
occurred. It would be too late at that point to ever return the indus-
try to a truly competitive state.
8 5
Because there is no threat of duplicative recovery in injunctive
actions, once the court is convinced that the proposed merger threat-
ens competition in the industry and that the plaintiff is within a class
of entities where injury to one or more of its members is likely, stand-
ing should be sufficiently established and the court should grant
injunctive relief. Congress provided that section 7 should be used to
prevent threats to competition in their incipiency and to prevent
undue concentration which Congress perceived as a threat to the
economy.8 6 Thus, once a court becomes convinced that a proposed
merger is harmful, it is in the public interest to issue an injunction no
matter who brought the case before the court. The alternative of per-
84. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 70, § 2948. The authors noted that more liberal
standards apply in granting injunctions which favor the public interest. Some courts have held
that a plaintiff need not show irreparable injury nor a balance of hardship in his favor where
federal statutes protecting the public interest are involved.
The congressional pronouncement in § 7 [of the Clayton Act] embodies the
irreparable injury of violation of its provisions. No further showing need be
made by those directed to enforce that section than that it is being violated or
threatened with violation. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate the precise manner
in which violation of the law will result in injury to the public interest. * * *
When the Government acts to enforce a statute or make effective a declared
policy of Congress, the standard of the public interest and not the requirements
of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief.
Id. § 2948, at 461 n.74 (quoting United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 544-45
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963)).
85. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
86. The Supreme Court has recognized that:
[Congress] passed and amended § 7 on the premise that mergers do tend to
accelerate concentration in an industry. Many believe that this assumption of
Congress is wrong, and that the disappearance of small businesses with a
correlative concentration of business in the hands of a few is bound to occur
whether mergers are prohibited or not. But it is not for the courts to review the
policy decision of Congress that mergers which may substantially lessen
competition are forbidden, which in effect the courts would be doing should they
now require proof of the congressional premise that mergers are a major cause of
concentration.
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (emphasis added).
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mitting the public and competitors to be injured because the exact
victims have not yet been identified is unacceptable.
IV. COMPETITORS: WHO ELSE WILL SUE?
Congress intended antitrust doctrine to develop as the result of
interaction between the legislative, administrative, and judicial
branches of government. It is vital, therefore, that all three branches
have some input into policymaking processes to ensure pluralism in
the enforcement and development of antitrust laws. Should courts
deny companies standing to enjoin illegal mergers of competitors, the
judiciary may be limited to hearing only those cases that meet the
administration's threshold levels of concentration.
As the Monfort court indicated, consumers and suppliers who
deal regularly with top firms in high four-firm concentration ratio
markets have a strong incentive to maintain good relationships with
those businesses and have no motivation to challenge proposed acqui-
sitions which in the short-term will be beneficial to them.87 Therefore,
where the government fails to act, direct competitors who are faced
with the prospect of losing their companies as a result of an illegal
merger are likely to be the only private parties who will challenge
acquisitions that tend to lessen competition and increase market con-
centration. It is thus appropriate that the Supreme Court affirm the
lower courts' decisions in Monfort which granted competitors stand-
ing to bring these types of actions in order to prevent permanent dam-
age to the public and the marketplace.
Just as a plurality of sellers enhances competition in the market-
place, a plurality of potential plaintiffs enhances competition in the
ideas that shape the judiciary's evolution of antitrust policy. Monop-
oly is no more desirable in antitrust policymaking than it is in the
economy.
MICHELLE CUERVO DUNAJ*
87. See supra note 73.
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